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Recent Developments 
Jackson v. State: 
Judge's Expansion Beyone the Outer Limits of His or Her Broad Discretionary 
Rights Equates to Impermissible Error 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that a judge's conmlents about a 
defendant's place of origin during the 
sentencing process amounted to 
impermissible sentencing criteria. 
Jackson v. State, 354 Md. 192,772 
A.2d273 (2001). In so holding, the 
court determined that the judge had 
erroneously considered the defendant's 
origin in fom1Ulating the sentence. The 
court noted that a judge may be granted 
broad discretion, however the origin of 
a defendant is clearly an inappropriate 
factor and creates an inference of a lack 
of impartiality. Id. at 208. 
On July 12, 1998, at 1 :00 a.m., the 
Defendant, Valentino Maurice Jackson 
("Jackson"), went to the home of the 
ViCtinl, Mitchell Woods ("Woods'), to 
buy cocaine, but Woods refused to sell 
itto him. On July 12,1998 at3:30 a.m. 
Jackson returned to Woods'home and 
was observed by a patrol officer ainling 
a short-barreled shotgun at Woods' 
chest. Jackson was then arrested and 
convicted in the Circuit Court for 
Howard County of first-degree assault, 
second-degree assault, reckless 
endangemlent, and unlawful possession 
of a short-barreled shotgun. During 
sentencing, the trial judge imposed an 
18 year sentence, and made the 
following statements: 
Now, unfortunately, a 
number of communities in 
the lovely city of Columbia 
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have attracted a large 
number of rotten apples. 
Unfortunately, most of them 
came from the city. And 
they live and act like they're 
living in a ghetto 
somewhere. And they 
weren't invited out here to 
behave like animals .... That 
is why people move out 
here to get away :from 
people like Mr. Jackson. 
Not to associate with them 
and have them follow them 
out here and act like this 
was a jungle of some kind. 
So. It's not. And our only 
chances to preserve it is to 
protect it. 
Id. at198. 
In an unreported opinion, the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland 
affirnled in part, reversed in part, and 
vacated the sentences for reckless 
endangerment and second-degree 
assault." Id. at 198. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari 
to determine whether the judge's 
comments at sentencing exceeded the 
outer limit of the judge's broad discretion 
in sentencing and if so, did it amount to 
impermissible sentencing criteria. 
Jackson, 354 Md. at 199,772 A.2d 
273. The court noted that not only 
should a judge be impartial and 
disinterested, but also that "the judge 
has the appearance of being impartial 
and disinterested". Id. at 207. The 
court concluded that the sentencing 
judge "at least in part, [acted] on the 
improper presumption that petitioner 
was from Baltimore City," in essence 
considering the defendant's origin in 
deciding the sentence. Id. at 208. 
Therefore, the court of appeals held the 
judge's comments at sentencing 
exceeded the outer limit of the judge's 
broad discretion and was impennissible 
sentencing criteria. Id. at 207. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by referring to prior case law 
granting a judge very broad discretion 
in sentencing criminal defendants. Id. 
at 199. The court identified the 
applicable grounds for appellate review 
of a trial courts sentence. The court 
detemlined that one appealable issue 
is when the sentencing judge is " 
motivated by ill-will, prejudice, or other 
impermissible considerations." Id. at 
200. The Jackson court concluded 
that the comments made by the trial 
court constituted review under this 
theory. Id. at 200. 
Next, the court compared the facts 
in Jackson to those in United States 
v: Diamond, 561 F.2d 557 (401 Cir. 
1977), in which the court identified 
inlpernrissible considerations made by 
the judge during the sentencing hearing. 
In Diamond, two defendants from 
New York were convicted in Virginia 
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of theft of an interstate shipment of 
goods. During sentencing, the judge 
said, "I suppose that you have a 
constitutional rightto commit a crime 
wherever you want to commit it. But 
the Court takes a dim view of people 
coming down from New York to 
conmrit their crimes in Vrrginia " Id. at 
200 (quoting United States v. 
Diamond, 561 F. 2d557, 559 (4ll1 Cir. 
1977). In Diamond, the court 
concluded there was no bias during the 
trial, but that the comments at sentencing 
reflected bias. The determination made 
by the court that the defendants had 
received a fair and just trial led them to 
affiml the conviction, while reversing the 
sentence due to the evidence of bias 
during the sentencing hearing. In 
comparison, in Jackson, during 
sentencing the judge "gave the 
impression that he based his sentence, 
at least in part, on something beyond 
the facts and circumstances of the crime 
and the background of petitioner." Id. 
at 20 1. Even though Jackson was not 
from Baltimore City, the judge may have 
factored in the defendant's origin as a 
criteria during the sentence. The court 
in Diamond concluded that a 
defendant's origin is irrelevant to and 
must not be considered in sentencing. 
In application of the holding in 
Diamond, and the statements made by 
the judge in Jackson, the court 
detemlined that while the judge has 
some degree of judicial discretion, a 
limitation imposed on a judge prevents 
the judge from using the defendants 
origin as a sentencing criteria. 
The court also explored the idea that 
the judge's comments may have been 
racially biased. The court believed that 
the comments made by the judge did 
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not reflect actual racial prejudice, 
however the court cautioned that they 
could lead areasonable person to draw 
such an inference that the sentence was 
racially motivated Id. at 202. Thecourt 
of appeals in Contee v. State, 223 Md. 
575, 165 A.2d 889 (1960), examined 
the theory of improper appeals to racial 
prejudice. In Contee, an African 
American man was tried for rape of a 
Caucasian woman. In Contee, the 
prosecutor continually emphasized the 
distinction in race between the victim 
and the defendant. Id. at 203. The 
court of appeals reasoned that while the 
racial comments in Conlee were blatant, 
1heracially biased result remained swar 
to that in Jackson, 364 Md. at 207. 
The court in Jackson relied on Con tee 
to uphold that the "matters of race and 
the matters of a defendant's place of 
residence or origin are inappropriate 
sentencing considerations," even when 
here is an absence of racial prejudice. 
Id. at 202. 
The court of appeals analyzed prior 
case law to clarify the distinction 
between pennissible and impennissible 
judicial remarks. The court applied the 
ruling in Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 
671 A.2d 501 (1996), in which a 
judge's comments concerning his 
religious and philosophical beliefs didnot 
infer that the sentence was motivated 
by ill will. Thejudge in Poe stated, ''what 
irritated [him] was this liberal philosophy 
.... I still believe in old fashion law .... 
Maybe one day1hey will say you should 
not sit here any more because you are 
too much of a dinosaur. You are too 
conservativeincriminallaw." Id. at206. 
(quoting Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 
671 A.2d 501 (1996)). The court in 
Poe deternlined a judge could make 
remarks., such as those stated above, 
as long as the sentence and the 
sentencing factors were not motivated 
by ill will, prejudice, origin or other 
impernrissible consideration. Id. at 206. 
The court distinguished the remarks in 
Jackson from 1hose inPoe by illustrating 
that the statements in Poe concerned 
the judge's personal beliefs and were 
not directed at any particular person. Id. 
at 207. Conversely, the remarks in 
Jackson were directed at the defendant 
andreflectedhow1hejudgeviewedhim 
personally. The court concluded that 
judicial comment should only retlecthow 
the law views the defendant's conduct, 
not how the judge views the defendants 
conduct. 
The holding by the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland in Jackson v. State 
redefines the discretionary powers 
granted to trial judges. The court in 
Jackson, while lirnitingthe discretionary 
authority, also reaffinns the fundanlental 
right of fairness and the extension of that 
righttothesentencingphase. Id. at207. 
The holding affirms Maryland's 
distinction in limiting the discretionary 
powers ofthe trial judge, and reasserts 
the right to equal treatment regardless 
of race, origin, or religion. Jackson 
verifies the practitioner's ability to appeal 
a sentence when a trial judge has 
stepped beyond the discretionary 
powers conferred upon the office, and 
factored a defendant's race, religion or 
origin into 1he sentencing guidelines. 
